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ABSTRACT. In 2013, following the leaks by Edward Snowden, The Guardian
published a number of classified NSA documents. Both leaking and publishing
leaks violate the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures. Accordingly, there are
two potential targets for prosecution: the leakers and the press. In practice,
however, only the leakers are prosecuted: Snowden is facing a threat of 30 years’
imprisonment; no charges have been made against The Guardian. If both leaking
and publishing leaks violate the law, why prosecute only the leakers and not the
press? I consider and reject two arguments. The first claims that the press has
special moral claims by virtue of its rights (press freedom) or its role (the Fourth
Estate; conduit for information). The second argument states that the leakers
commit a greater wrong than the press. I conclude that the current prosecution
practice is inconsistent: prosecutors should either prosecute both or neither.
In 2013 Edward Snowden, a former contractor for the CIA, copied,
without authorization, thousands of classified NSA documents. He
then leaked those documents to Glenn Greenwald, a reporter on The
Guardian. The classified information was subsequently published by
The Guardian and later by media outlets worldwide.
Both leaking and publishing leaks violate the law prohibiting
unauthorized disclosures in that they disclose classified information
to persons not authorized to receive it. Charges can be raised on a
number of grounds. For example, in the US, besides the Espionage
Act, the Atomic Energy Act, and the Intelligence Identities Protec-
tion Act, the 18 U.S. Code § 798 applies:
Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes
available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety
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or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of
the United States any classified information (…) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.
Similar statutes exist elsewhere: In the Netherlands, Art 98 Wetboek
van Strafrecht; in Poland, Art 265 § 1 Penal Code.1
Given that leaking classified information and publishing it con-
stitute a legal offense, there are two potential targets for prosecution:
the leakers and the press. In actual legal and political practice,
however, only the leakers are prosecuted; reporters, editors and
publishers go unpunished. Snowden is facing a threat of 30 years’
imprisonment, but no charges have been made against Greenwald
and The Guardian. Commenting on this practice of selective prose-
cution in the US context, David Pozen observed:
As compared to the legal vulnerability of their government sources, journalists and other private
actors who publish leaked information appear to occupy a privileged position. (…) Although it
has contemplated doing so several times, the government has never once, over the past half
century, proceeded against a member of the media for publishing or possessing leaked infor-
mation.2
Apparently, as Greenwald approvingly notes:
There are both formal and unwritten legal protections offered to journalists that are unavailable
to anyone else. While it is considered generally legitimate for a journalist to publish government
secrets, for example, that’s not the case for someone acting in any other capacity.3
The difference in treatment that leakers and press receive regarding
unauthorized disclosures raises the following question: If both
leaking and publishing classified information violate the law
prohibiting unauthorized disclosures, why prosecute only the leakers
and not the press? Why Snowden, not Greenwald? I am interested in
the moral dimension of the puzzle: Are both parties not equally
morally culpable? Is leaking a secret not the same thing as publishing
a secret? In addressing this puzzle, this essay searches for a moral
disanalogy between the sources of the leaks and their distributors,
which would justify their different treatment.
1 For country overview: OSCE 2008. Access to information by the media in the OSCE region:
Country Reports.
2 Pozen, D. 2013. ‘The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful
Disclosures of Information’. Harvard Law Review 127, pp. 525, 535. See also Sagar, R. 2013. Secrets and
Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy. Princeton University Press, p. 177.
3 Greenwald, G. 2014. No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State.
Metropolitan Books, p. 181.
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Here, I enter unexplored territory. Philosophical discussions have
addressed the moral and legal accountability of civil servants for
leaking classified government information, but have not attended to
press accountability. Likewise, the difference in treatment accorded
civil servants and press with regard to unauthorized disclosures has
not received attention. This essay fills this gap. I consider two
juridical arguments, which set out to establish a moral disanalogy
between leakers and press, thus justifying the practice of selective
prosecution. I refute both, concluding that we have no moral reason
for treating the press differently from leakers.
In developing my argument, I assume that state secrecy is, under
certain conditions, legitimate. When it is not legitimate (concealing,
for example, power abuse or wrongdoing), its disclosure is justified
and this essay’s question does not arise: We have a moral reason for
dropping prosecution of leakers and press rather than differentiating
them.4 Assuming that state secrecy may be a legitimate exercise of
democratic authority, I do not defend this claim: Given that the
considerations justifying secret uses of power remain the same
irrespective of who discloses classified information, spelling out these
considerations will not indicate a possible difference in the status of
the disclosers. For a discussion of the legitimacy of state secrecy, I
refer the reader to my earlier work.5
I. THE FIRST ARGUMENT FROM DISANALOGY: THE PRESS HAS A MORAL
JUSTIFICATION UNAVAILABLE TO LEAKERS
One way to justify the different treatment civil servants and press
receive for disseminating classified information relies on the claim
that unauthorized disclosures by the press have a status differing
from those by civil servants. By virtue of freedom of the press, the
press may publish whatever content editors choose, including leaks.
Freedom of the press gives it the prerogative to balance compliance
with the law against its conviction regarding the importance of
publishing leaked information. If the press has a justification
4 For the opposite view (illegitimate classification does not justify suspending prosecution), see, e.g.,
Schoenfeld, G. 2010. Necessary Secrets, National Security, The Media, and The Rule of Law. NY: Norton &
Co.
5 Mokrosinska, D. 2019. ‘Political Authority and State Secrecy’, Public Affairs Quarterly 33 (1);
Mokrosinska, D. 2018. ‘The People’s Right to Know and State Secrecy’, Canadian Journal of Law and
Jurisprudence 31(1). See also Thompson, D. 1999. ‘Democratic Secrecy: The Dilemma of Accountability’.
Political Science Quarterly 114(2); Sagar, Secrets and Leaks.
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unavailable to leakers, we should not prosecute the press even if we
prosecute leakers.
A. Freedom of the press
Contemporary literature on press freedom appropriates John Stuart
Mill’s reasons for protecting individual rights of self-expression and
free speech. Mill argued that ‘absolute freedom of opinion (…) on all
subjects, practical and speculative, scientific, moral, or theological’
implies ‘liberty of expressing and publishing opinions’ because this is
‘practically inseparable’ from the freedom to express oneself.6 Fol-
lowing Mill, the literature on the freedom of the press extends
individual rights of self-expression to the press. As Judith Lichtenberg
observes:
[W]hen we examine the most famous arguments for freedom of the press, we find nothing to
distinguish them from those for freedom of speech or expression more generally. The press is
treated as a voice, albeit a more powerful one, on a par with individual voices, and defending
press freedom is then tantamount to a general defense of free speech.7
Assuming that press freedom is a species of freedom of speech and
self-expression, any extraordinary privileges it would confer upon the
press with regard to publishing classified information must be
privileges that the press enjoys in virtue of freedom of speech. Does
freedom of speech confer such privileges upon the press?
This question is usually answered ‘yes’. While leaking classified
information constitutes a criminal offense, publishing leaks is seen as
protected by ‘First Amendment values’.8 From the perspective of
freedom of speech legislation, that an act is ordinarily unlawful is not
conclusive. For example, as Geoffrey Stone explains, it may be
unlawful to obstruct the draft. Correspondingly, an individual who
physically blocks access to a selective service office can be punished,
‘but an individual who distributes leaflets criticizing the draft as
immoral cannot be punished. The criminal law is the same but the
pamphleteer is protected by the First Amendment’.9 Similarly, a
journalist who publishes classified information is committing a
crime, unless it is shown that the First Amendment affords her
6 Mill, J. S. 1989. On Liberty. Ed. S. Collini. Cambridge University Press, p. 15.
7 Lichtenberg, J. 1990. Democracy and the Mass Media: A Collection of Essays. Cambridge University
Press, p. 105.
8 Pozen, Leaky Leviathan, p. 529.
9 Stone, G. 2007. Top Secret. Rowman and Littlefield, p. 30.
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protection. The press has not yet been prosecuted; thus, the
impression arises that its prosecution is indeed incompatible with
such legislation. The fact is, however, that the courts have had no
opportunity to resolve this issue. In the US, the court addressed the
question in the Pentagon Papers case but left it unanswered.10 Nor
has the question received systematic theoretical attention. The
conclusion must be that free speech legislation has not yet been
demonstrated to impede prosecution of the press. The next two
sections address this unresolved problem from a moral perspective.
B. Freedom of speech: Interests of the speaker
One major theory of free speech sees it as a right protecting the
autonomy and self-expression of the speaker.11 Restrictions on what
individuals say and write are an affront to their autonomy and, thus,
the autonomy-related interest implicit in the right to free speech
requires that individuals have a right to speak without interference.
Assume for the sake of argument that the press too can exercise a
right to free speech so understood: the autonomy-related interest
implicit in the press’s right to free speech requires that it has a right
to publish without interference. Does this account of free speech
support the press’s privilege to publish classified information?
Two reasons show this cannot be so. First, this account does not
support a press privilege to publish classified information because it
does not justify disclosure of classified information at all. Second, even
if it did so, it would not establish the moral disanalogy between press
and leakers required to justify selective prosecution.
So, the claim that appealing to freedom of speech justifies dis-
closures of classified information presumes that such disclosure
constitutes speech and, therefore, should be protected. A prohibition
on disclosure would be a prohibition on free speech and, hence, an
affront. Yet a defense of unauthorized disclosures in terms of this
account would be problematic. On this account, as Wojciech Sa-
durski put it, ‘[s]peech as a vehicle of self-fulfillment has no other
immediate aims than to be uttered and heard, while we believe that
often the ‘point of the speech’ lies in its capacity to bring about the
10 Stone, Top Secret; Sagar Secrets and Leaks, pp. 107–108.
11 Mill, On Liberty; Scanlon, T. 1979. ‘Freedom of expression and the categories of expression’.
Pittsburgh Law Review 40.
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results desired by the speaker’.12 Saying that Greenwald has a right
to publish classified information by virtue of his right to free speech
commits us to saying that Greenwald is justified in publishing clas-
sified information because doing so is his way of expressing himself.
Alternatively, The Guardian is justified in publishing leaks because
this is how its editorial board exercises its autonomy. The problem
with this is that it trivializes the importance of leaks. We believe that
the point of publishing leaks is the impact they will have. Yet on the
free speech defense presented above, such disclosures have no rel-
evance other than advancing the self-expression of the journalist or
the autonomy of the newspaper’s editorial board. Onora O’Neill has
articulated this concern more generally: this approach overlooks the
significance of the content of press reporting. As the media are in the
communication business, its driving force should be concern about
content, not self-expression.13
Defending disclosures of classified information by appeals to self-
expression and autonomy creates yet another problem. The argu-
ment implies that Greenwald is justified in publishing classified
information, that is, in violating the law prohibiting unauthorized
disclosures, if this law limits his self-expression. More generally, it
implies that the law is binding only as it accords with our self-
expression. But this is to be very confused about law’s normative
force. By analogy, the rule setting the speed limit at 100 km/h is
binding only when it coincides with my self-expression: I have a
Maserati, express myself by speeding at 200 km/h, therefore the
speed limit isn’t binding. To understand law’s normative force like
this makes a legal system inconsistent, bidding us to think there is a
right to violate the law. A like problem has surfaced in the debate on
the justification for whistleblowing. Despite there being no legal
right to whistleblowing, lawyers and legal scholars often argue that
unauthorized disclosures may enjoy protection under the right to
freedom of expression. Thus, sanctions against whistleblowers are
described as ‘violations’ of their rights. As Eric Boot persuasively
argues, however, it is impossible to reconcile the general prohibition
on whistleblowing with the claim that there is a freedom-of-ex-
pression-based legal right to whistleblowing: Such a legally recog-
12 Sadurski, W. 1999. Freedom of Speech and Its Limits. Kluwer, p. 17.
13 O’Neill, O. 2009. ‘Ethics for Communication?’ European Journal of Philosophy 17, p. 169.
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nized right would mean the law recognizing a right to break the
law.14
Even if the appeal to free speech did justify disclosures of classified
information, this would not ground a disanalogy in the normative
situation of leakers and press. Freedom of speech is directed at
speech in general and, thus, applies to both leakers and press. To
claim it applies particularly to journalists’ speech suggests that the
press enjoys the right to free speech more than others, committing
us to the unreasonable claim that journalists are more important
than others.15 In conclusion, this account of free speech based on the
interests of the speaker fails as a defense of the press’s privilege to
publish unauthorized disclosures: Quite aside from its implausibility,
this argument excludes preemptively any difference between press
and civil servants with regard to disclosures of classified informa-
tion.16
Before exploring another theory of free speech, let me briefly
consider the suggestion that the speaker’s interests may have nothing
to do with freedom of speech. Judith Lichtenberg notes we may be
dealing with the speaker’s claims to property:
The publisher may say: ‘It’s my newspaper and I can print what I want.’ (…) Such a claim to
editorial autonomy is really (…) the assertion of a property right in the guise of a free speech
right.17
Is the press’s appeal to property rights a better defense of its privilege
to publish classified information? If the claim is that a newspaper is
free to publish classified information because it is a private business,
and can publish whatever it wants, then this argument fails because
governments regulate private property. If other private businesses
are subject to state regulation, it is unclear why media organizations
should be immune from it.18
14 Boot, E. 2017. ‘Classified Public Whistleblowing: How to Justify a pro tanto Wrong’. Social Theory
and Practice 43, pp. 72–74.
15 Dworkin, R. 1985. A Matter of Principle. Harvard University Press, p. 387.
16 Note that the argument overlooks the fact that free speech is usually hedged by restrictions.
Article 10 of the ECHR indicates the social and private interests for which speech may be restricted:
national security, prevention of disorder/crime, protection of health, morals, or the reputation of
others. Given that classifying government information is a matter of protecting social interests (law
enforcement/national security), classified information-related speech is unlikely to be protected.
17 Lichtenberg, Democracy and the Mass Media, p. 120.
18 See: Holmes, S. 1990. ‘Liberal Constraints on Private Power? Reflections on the Origins and
Rationale of Access Regulation’. In J. Lichtenberg (ed.) Democracy and the mass media. Cambridge
University Press.
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C. Freedom of speech: Interests of the listeners
According to a second influential understanding, free speech protects
the interests of the speaker only insofar as her exercise of free speech
serves the interests of listeners.19 As Stephen Holmes put it, ‘At issue
is the access of listeners to information not the access of speakers to
the microphone’.20 Greenwald’s self-expression requires protection
only insofar as it serves the people’s access to information.
The importance of people’s access to information is explained in
terms of a more fundamental argument: People’s access to infor-
mation is relevant in democracies so they can make informed, au-
tonomous decisions. In its early version, put forward by Alexander
Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson, the democratic account of free
speech presented people’s access to information as a condition of
people’s self-government.21 Drawing on the idea of popular sover-
eignty, Emerson argues:
The public, as sovereign, must have all information available in order to instruct its servants, the
government. As a general proposition, if democracy is to work, there can be no holding back of
information; otherwise, ultimate decision-making by the people (…) becomes impossible.22
The idea of popular sovereignty in its purest form has been dropped
in modern democratic theory, replaced by concepts of participation,
deliberation, accountability, oversight, and public opinion. Despite
this shift in the conceptual framework, democratic justification of
freedom of speech retains its appeal. Free speech is entitled to
protection because it fosters communication, contributes to forming
citizens’ political preferences and reasoned political deliberation, and
exposes people to the information they need to hold decision-makers
to account.23 On this account, the press has a right to publish
classified information as this right serves the interests of democratic
citizens by, for example, triggering debate on the desirability of
classified government programs, without which government deci-
sions and policies would suffer a democratic deficit.24
19 Mill, On Liberty; Raz, J. 1991. ‘Free Expression and Personal Identification’. Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 11(3).
20 Holmes, ‘Liberal Constraints on Private Power?’, p. 48.
21 Meiklejohn, A. 1948. Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government. Harper & Brothers; Emerson,
T. 1976. ‘Legal Foundations of the Right to Know’. Washington University Law Quarterly 1.
22 Emerson, ‘Legal Foundations’, p. 14.
23 Sunstein, C. 1995. Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech. New York: Free Press.
24 Cf. Markovits, D. 2005. ‘Democratic disobedience’. Yale Law Journal 114.
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Let me briefly compare this defense of special privileges of the
press to the one discussed in the previous section. Theories of free
speech concerned to protect the audience argue that a reporter
must enjoy special protections not because she is entitled to them
but in order to secure some general benefit to the public as a
whole. Ronald Dworkin refers to arguments of this kind as argu-
ments of policy.25 This is different from freedom of speech argu-
ments granting the reporter special protection in terms of her
interests as a speaker: there the reporter is granted protection not in
order that others benefit, but because she as a speaker would suffer
some unacceptable injury or insult if censored (she would be
granted protection even if the community as such suffered from
allowing her to speak). Dworkin refers to arguments of this kind as
arguments of principle.
As Dworkin observes, the defense of free speech based on arguments
of policy is weaker than the one based on arguments of principle.
Arguments defending freedom of speech in terms of certain benefits
which the exercise of free speech procures (for example, political par-
ticipation) must yield when there is reason to believe that other private
and social interests of the community (for example, public security)
demand constraints on it. They thus invite the reply that in some cases
the public’s interest would be better served, on balance, by censorship
rather than by publication.26 Arguments of principle in support of
freedom of speech cannot be defeated in this way; if there is a conflict
between the rights of the individual speaker as an individual and the
competing interest of the community, the former trumps the latter.
However, Dworkin argues, even though the defense of freedom of
speech as a matter of principle is stronger, it is less promising with
regard to establishing special privileges of the press. Offering the re-
porter special protections in terms of the principle-based account of free
speech leads, as we saw in the previous section, to the unreasonable
conclusion that the reporter’s interests, as an individual speaker, are
25 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, ch. 18 and 19.
26 ibid, p. 389.
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more important than the similar interests of others. In this respect, it is
more plausible to support special privileges of the press in terms of the
policy-based account of free speech arguing that the reporter’s exercise
of freedom of speech has democracy-enhancing consequences and, thus,
secures an important benefit to the community.
Does this democratic, policy-based account of free speech provide
us with tools to justify the different legal treatment of leakers and
press with regard to unauthorized disclosures? It is not necessary to
engage with this argument to say that, even if correct, it would not
justify the practice of selective prosecution. Even if an appeal to free
speech justifies the press’s publication of classified information by
virtue of its democracy-enhancing consequences, the same conse-
quences follow disclosures by civil servants. Indeed, this argument
has been invoked by lawyers in cases of unauthorized disclosures by
civil servants. The European Court of Human Rights, in its first
whistleblowing case, argued that disclosure is justified if the public
interest is served by the information disclosed.27 In the US, defen-
dants have appealed to their First Amendment rights with the de-
fense construing the leaker’s right to free speech in terms of the
democracy-reinforcing consequences of her disclosures (not her
individual interests in autonomy or self-expression).28 Given that an
appeal to freedom of speech can be invoked to protect leakers just as
it is invoked to protect the press, it will not privilege the press over
civil servants with regard to disseminating classified information. Of
course, when ascertaining whether an unauthorized disclosure will
enjoy protection under the right to freedom of expression, the courts
typically balance the interest of the public in having the information
revealed against the considerations underpinning the law prohibiting
unauthorized disclosures. In effect, the right to free speech the courts
establish in these cases contains provisions limiting its scope in order
to account for, say, national security or confidentiality of diplomatic
negotiations.29 However, if the press exercises the same right, its
27 Guja v. Moldova, ECHR 14277/04, 2008.
28 Benkler, Y. 2014. ‘A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and Whistle-
blowers’. Harvard Law and Policy Review 8, p. 305.
29 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Grand Chamber). Guja v. Moldova. 12 February
2008. Application No. 14277/04. § 76.
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exercise of this right should be subject to the same limiting provi-
sions. Thus, the different treatment accorded press and leakers for
violating the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures remains a
puzzle.30
D. Chilling effect
If the appeal to freedom of speech does not justify a privileged
position for the press with regard to unauthorized disclosures, a
different component of freedom of speech adjudication could per-
haps do the job. In particular, one could argue that the law pro-
hibiting unauthorized disclosures has the incidental effect of
deterring, or chilling, speech that society has reason to encourage
such as, for example, disclosures of information that reveal abuses of
power. Strict execution of the law prohibiting unauthorized disclo-
sures could deter such speech, especially when the speakers are
hesitant about the value of the information they disclose, a situation
likely to arise when the (il)legitimacy of a government’s actions may
30 Defending press freedom in terms of its democracy-enhancing consequences resembles another
famous argument for it viz. the marketplace of ideas. While democracy-enhancing consequences are the
thrust of the former, discovery of the truth is at stake in the latter. Originating with John Milton
(Milton, J. (1918 [1644]) Areopagitica. A speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of
England, ed. R. Jebb. Cambridge University Press), the argument found systematic articulation in John
Stuart Mill (1989). Free, unfiltered and uninhibited circulation of information and opinions allows
discovery and testing truth and detecting and rejecting falsehood. In American First Amendment
jurisprudence, the argument was subsequently phrased in terms of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor.
Thus, free trade of ideas, like an economic market, can mobilize resources otherwise dormant, stim-
ulating them into use, bringing the truth into political controversies enabling the best policies to
emerge. From this perspective, publication of classified information has epistemic advantages because it
triggers exchanges of ideas in the public forum which have beneficial effects on the quality of political
decisions. As a justification of the practice of selective prosecution, this argument fails for the same
reason the appeal to the democracy-enhancing consequences of free speech does viz. it establishes no
difference between press and leakers. Moreover, the assumptions upon which the argument rests make
it problematic on its own count (see Schauer, F. 1982. Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge
University Press). First, it assumes that truth always drives out falsehood and prejudice. Yet confronted
with many historical examples, this assumption appears empirically unfounded (Holmes, ‘Liberal
Constraints on Private Power?’, p. 34). The phenomena of fake news, echo chambers, and filter bubbles
demonstrate that there is no empirical basis for believing that when ideas are tested publicly, truth will
necessarily prevail. Second, in claiming that broad press freedoms, including freedom to publish clas-
sified information, will result in more true beliefs, the argument assumes that the search for truth
should enjoy precedence over other social goods. This assumption is problematic because other
interests can at times predominate (Schauer, Free Speech, p. 33). For example, as Boot (Boot, E. 2019.
‘Leaks and the Limits of Press Freedom’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22(2), p. 14) claims, ‘at times,
(…) national security concerns may very well outweigh the search for truth and thus justify state
secrecy as well as limits upon the scope of press freedom’. Finally, the position presupposes that more
information is better. However, ‘[u]ntrammeled exchanges in that famous marketplace are as likely to
lead to a Babel of voices as to comprehension, let alone discovery of truth’ (O’Neill, O. 2014. ‘The
Rights of Journalism and the Needs of Audiences’. In: Lewis, J and Crick, P. Media Law and Ethics in the
21st Century Protecting Free Expression and Curbing Abuses. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 39).
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be a matter of reasonable disagreement.31 As we have reason to
avoid the chilling effect, we are justified giving leaks ‘strategic pro-
tection’ viz. abstaining from the imposition of sanctions in cases in
which such sanctions would otherwise be permitted. Now one could
argue that the chilling effect of the law prohibiting unauthorized dis-
closures is greater on the press than on leakers because leakers have the
advantage of disclosing information anonymously, while the press does
not. Anonymity weakens the probability of prosecution and thereby
weakens its chilling effect. The press, without the option of anonymity,
is more vulnerable to the chilling effect of the law and more likely to
censor itself and refrain from publishing instances of government
wrongdoing. As the risk of the chilling effect is greater with regard to
the press, there is reason for a more lenient prosecution of the press.
This is controversial on two counts. According to the argument, it
is necessary to protect speech disseminating even harmful leaks be-
cause any prospect of punishment would create an impermissible
chill on speech that discloses information that society has reason to
value. The reasoning is problematic: To arrive at this claim, one
must weigh the benefits of the law prohibiting unauthorized dis-
closures, on the one hand, against the probability that valuable leaks
will be put at risk, on the other hand. This balancing exercise is
practically impossible because establishing the quantity and value of
leaks that would be chilled is entirely counterfactual – the leaks in
question have not yet been leaked. The counterfactual calculations
involved in the argument cast doubt on its validity. This problem
resonates in more general concerns raised about the chilling effect
argument. The behavioral assumptions for the chilling effect argu-
ment rest upon predictions about the behavior of subjects of the law
under counterfactual conditions. Yet, as many scholars concede, no
empirical evidence has been produced to justify those predictions. It
has not been clearly established that individuals are deterred or be-
come overly cautious as a result of the existence of particular reg-
ulations. For example, as Leslie Kendrick admits, ‘It is difficult to
establish either the presence or the absence of a chilling effect, let
alone to measure the extent of such an effect’.32 If such empirical
31 See Sagar, Secret and Leaks, pp. 128–130 for examples.
32 Kendrick, L. 2013. ‘Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect’. William & Mary Law Review 54, p. 43.
See also Schauer, F. 1978. ‘Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect’, Boston
University Law Review 58, p. 730.
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assumptions have little demonstrable basis, then the legitimacy of a
policy to prevent the effect is questionable.
Second, the empirical claims the argument makes about the
vulnerability of leakers and press to the chilling effect are problem-
atic: In the light of new surveillance/investigation techniques the
claim that leakers are likely to stay anonymous is doubtful. Heidi
Kitrosser observes, for example, that new technological and legal
tools (phone/e-mail records, electronic indicia of travel and in-per-
son meetings; third party subpoenas to banks, communications and
credit card companies) enable governments to track leakers more
easily than ever.33 Journalists report that these new realities have
chilled their communications with leakers. The claim regarding the
relative vulnerability of the press to the chilling effect is equally
problematic. As Frederick Schauer explains, the behavior of re-
porters, editors and publishers is more impervious to a chilling effect
than commonly thought.34 For example, libel law is often believed to
have publication-deterrent consequences. However, Schauer reports
significant journalistic disregard of the potential legal liability for
libel. It is not evident the press is less willing to publish; rather,
‘publishers treat libel as a cost of doing business’.35 Moreover, he
claims, journalistic awards, opportunities for professional recogni-
tion, routes to professional esteem, and avenues for promotion
reinforce or require risky behavior on the part of journalists, editors
and publishers, and, in effect do more than counteract the chilling
effect of libel law. There is no reason to assume that the situation is
any different with regard to other areas of legislation such as the law
prohibiting unauthorized disclosures.
Thus, the chilling effect argument is unsuccessful and cannot be
used to justify the practice of selective prosecution.
E. The press as fourth estate
For the press to enjoy a special dispensation to publish classified
information, the press must enjoy a special status compared to leakers.
33 Kitrosser, H. 2015. ‘Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment: New Developments and a
Closer Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers’. William & Mary Law Review 56, pp. 1247–1249.
34 Schauer, F. 2005. ‘On the Relationship between Press Law and Press Content’. In Timothy Cook,
ed., Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action. Louisiana State University Press, p. 64.
35 ibid, p. 59.
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It is often argued that the press is entitled to special protections because
it is the ‘fourth branch of government’. As Lee Bollinger observes:
The dominant image of the press views the press as the Fourth Estate, as an entity serving a
critical quasi-official function in the political system. It elevates the press to the highest rung on
society’s organizational chart and anoints it as the public’s representative.36
This view has been endorsed by a number of American First
Amendment scholars and has occasionally been defended by the US
Supreme Court: ‘The primary purpose [of the Press clause was] to
create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional
check on the three officials branches. (…). The relevant metaphor
(…) [is that] of the Fourth Estate’.37 This idea is also a potent part of
journalists’ self-identity. Among others, Greenwald sees the role of
the press thus: ‘One of the principal institutions ostensibly devoted
to monitoring and checking abuse of state power is the political
media. The theory of a ‘fourth estate’ is to ensure government
transparency and provide a check on overreach’.38
The press’s role as a ‘fourth estate’ is commonly presented as
correlative to the ‘people’s right to know’. The ‘right to know’ is
understood as a right held by any individual, as against a govern-
ment, to know about the workings and dealings of that govern-
ment.39 According to the fourth estate argument, the press, in its
capacity as the fourth branch of government, serves as a trustee of
the ‘people’s right to know’. As American constitutional scholar
Alexander Bickel put it, ‘The reporter’s access is the public’s access.
(…). The issue is the public’s right to know. That right is the re-
porter’s by virtue of the proxy which the freedom of the press (…)
gives to the press in behalf of the public’.40
Sometimes this role is spelled out in terms of the adversarial role of
the press viz. the press is presented as a competing power to that of
government. Greenwald subscribes to this militant model of journal-
ism when he approvingly quotes The New York Times’ war corre-
spondent David Halberstam for whom, as Greenwald phrases it,
‘infuriating the government was a source of pride, the true purpose
and calling of journalism’.41 According to proponents of this approach,
36 Bollinger, L. 1991. Images of a Free Press. University of Chicago Press, pp. 58–59.
37 Stewart, P. 1975. ‘Or of the Press’. Hastings Law Journal 26, pp. 633–634.
38 Greenwald, No Place to Hide, p. 179.
39 Schauer, F. 1983. ‘Rights and the Right to Know’. Philosophic Exchange 14, p. 70.
40 Bickel, A. 1975. The Morality of Consent. Yale University Press, p. 85.
41 Greenwald, No Place to Hide, p. 207.
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the struggle between press and government produces an equilibrium:
The goals of the democratic system are served, as if by an invisible
hand, when the government is doing all it can to stop the press from
getting information, and the press is publishing just about anything it
can get its hands on. ‘[T]he press is (…) one party to a contest’, Bickel
claimed. ‘It is the contest that serves the public interest’.42
What does the fourth estate model imply for the publication policy
of the press with regard to classified information? On the adversarial
version of this argument, the press, in virtue of this role, has no duty to
comply with government calls for non-publication. Given that the press
has no duty to keep state secrets, it commits no wrong in disclosing
them. In effect, the press is justified in publishing state secrets whenever
it sees fit: ‘the press’, Bickel argues, ‘may publish materials that the
government wishes to, and is entitled to, keep private’.43 An excellent
summary of this view was recently issued by the deans of the leading
US schools of journalism. After The New York Times revealed the Ter-
rorist Financing Tracking Program, they declared: ‘It is the business –
and the responsibility – of the press to reveal secrets’.44
When fourth estate proponents drop their adversarial rhetoric and
present the press simply as an element of a system of checks and
balances, it implies that any government decision on classification must
be subject to a check and approval by the press. In this spirit, Leonard
Downie, the Executive Editor of The Washington Post, asserted: ‘it’s
important (…) in our constitutional system that (…) final decisions
[about publishing classified material and whether publication would
indeed threaten the nation’s safety] be made by newspaper editors and
not the government’.45 Or, as editors of the New York Times and the Los
Angeles Times claimed, ‘Decision on whether or not to publish classified
information (…) is not one we can surrender to the government’.46
The fourth estate argument presents the press as occupying a
unique role in the political system, one that leakers do not occupy. If
correct, this would justify the different treatment press and leakers
receive for disseminating classified information. Below, I claim that
42 Bickel, The Morality of Consent, p. 81.
43 ibid, p. 80.
44 Cited after Sagar, Secret and Leaks, p. 167.
45 Cited after BeVier, L. 2006. ‘The Journalist’s Privilege. A Skeptic’s View’. Ohio Northern University
Law Review 32(3), p. 472.
46 New York Times 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/01/opinion/01keller.html.
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this argument cannot succeed because we cannot make sense of the
press as a ‘fourth estate’.
A model that has been widely used to illuminate the relationship
between citizens and the three branches of government is the prin-
cipal-agent relation, in which one party (principal) authorizes another
(agent) to represent her interests and to act on her behalf and the latter
provides an account of her actions with respect to those interests.47 In
this approach, citizens are viewed as principals and government actors
as agents. Presenting the press as a ‘fourth branch’ of government
would imply that it too stands in an agency relation to the people.
Indeed, when the US Supreme Court entertained the idea that the
press is analogous to the fourth branch of government, they presented
journalists as ‘agents’ of the public at large. For example, in 1974,
Justice Lewis Powell declared that ‘in seeking out the news, the press
(…) acts as an agent of the public at large. (…) The underlying right is
the right of the public generally. The press is the necessary represen-
tative of the public’s interest’.48 Such a description of the relationship
of the press to the people, however, is misleading on several counts.
For one, in the context of the principal-agent relation, agents are
prohibited from acting in their own interests and required to advance the
interests of the principals. Thus, government actors/agents are prohib-
ited from acting to further their own interests; they must act in the
interests of their citizens/principals. The press, by contrast, is a private
actor free to act in its own interests as determined by market dynamics.49
47 Christiano, T. 1996. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Westview Press.
48 Cited after BeVier, ‘The Journalist’s Privilege’, p. 469, emphasis added.
49 BeVier, ‘The Journalist’s Privilege’, p. 475. One could object to this argument by claiming that the
fact that the press is acting on its own interests does not preclude its standing in a principal-agent
relation to the people. In particular, the argument could go, we do not hesitate to describe political
parties as agents of the people even when they act on special interests, e.g., interests of ethnic
minorities, regional interests or separatist movements. If we don’t hesitate to describe political parties
whose main aim is to protect special interests as agents of the people, what would prevent us from so
describing the press? To answer this objection, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the analogy between
political parties and the press does not hold. While both press and political parties may act on special
interests, these are of different kinds. Special interests can be private or partial; while all private interests
are partial, not all partial interests are private. Political parties do not act on private interests even
though they act on partial interests. Moreover, the existence of political bodies representing certain
segments of society is part of the political division of labor in a representative democracy. It ensures that
all social groups can ultimately be represented in decision-making bodies which, in turn, guarantees the
principal-agent relation between political representative institutions and the people. To say that the
press acts on special interests is to say that they act on the private interests of their owners, e.g., the
personal commercial interests of media tycoons. Organizations representing the private commercial
interests of specific individuals are not part of the political division of labor in a representative
democracy. The media, acting on private interests, rather than on the interests of (certain sections of)
the people cannot be seen as an agent of the people.
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Secondly, while the people can be said to authorize the three
branches of government as their agents, they cannot be said to so
authorize the press. Unlike the powers of government, the powers of
the press are neither conferred upon it by the people – they are not
subject, for example, to regular elections – nor by their representa-
tives.50 From this perspective, if the press claims the authority to
reverse classification decisions taken by government officials through
its publication decisions, then its view of its competences is flawed
because representative democracies grant such authority to elected
government officials and not to editors. When the press discloses
classified information, then, it violates the democratic allocation of
power.51
50 The thrust of this argument is that the press is not an agent of the people because it is not
authorized by them. In response, one could claim that the people don’t authorize at least one branch of
government viz. its judicial branch. To the extent that this claim holds, it puts pressure on the argument
that the press cannot be an agent of the people: If the fact that the judiciary is not authorized by the
people doesn’t prevent us from construing it as an agent of the people, the fact that the press is not
authorized by the people cannot prevent us from construing it as an agent of the people either. In
response to this objection, first, I question the claim that the judiciary is not authorized by the people:
Just like the other branches, it is. If correct, this argument breaks the analogy between press and
judiciary and allows us to present the latter but not the former as an agent of the people. In repre-
sentative democracies, people can authorize office holders directly or indirectly. People authorize office
holders directly when they, e.g., vote for them. They authorize them indirectly when they do so
through their representatives. Even if the judiciary is not directly authorized by the people, it is
authorized indirectly by the people’s representatives. Moreover, the appointment process of judges is
determined by a constitutional procedure that is authorized by the people. The process differs per
legislative system. In the US all federal judges are nominated by the President and must be confirmed by
the US Senate by majority vote. Following confirmation, the President finally makes the decision to
commission the judges to their position. In most European countries the executive or legislative
branches play a decisive role in the appointment of judges. Federal judges in Germany are appointed by
the Federal President, after being elected. The judges are elected by the Judges Election Committee
consisting of sixteen ministers of the substates and sixteen members elected by the German Parliament.
In the UK, judges are elected by a judicial appointments committee consisting of twelve members of the
Ministry of Justice and three members of a judicial council. Thus, all branches all government, including
the judiciary, are authorized either directly by the people or by the people’s representatives. No such
authorization processes obtain with regard to the press: Neither the people nor their representatives
confer any decision-making powers on the media, and the analogy between the media and the judiciary
does not hold. Nor does the argument it was meant to support viz. that the press, just like the three
branches of government, is an agent of the people. Second, I argue that the press cannot be a fourth
branch of government because it lacks the kind of action-guiding powers commonly ascribed to
government. The authoritative powers exercised by governments have traditionally been described as
content-independent: It is the fact that the action-guiding directives have been issued, not their content,
that is intended to provide the subject with a reason for action (Hart, H.L.A. 1997. The Concept of Law.
Oxford: Clarendon Press; Raz, J. 1979. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Green, L. 1988.
The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Christiano, T. 2008. The Constitution of Equality.
Democratic Authority and Its Limits. Oxford University Press). Whatever action-guiding power press
reporting has is entirely a matter of its content.
51 Sagar. Secrets and Leaks, pp. 113–114; Xanders, E. 1989. ‘A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National
Security Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb Unauthorized Publication of
classified information’. Journal of Law and Politics 5(4), p. 779; BeVier ‘The Journalist’s Privilege’, p. 472.
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Facts concerning the democratic allocation of power aside, the
hypothetical proposition to recognize the press as professionally
entitled to reveal state secrets would build an inconsistency into the
system of democratic authority. On the traditional conception of
political authority, the exercise of authority creates correlative obli-
gations to obey its directives (within limits). From this perspective,
authorizing the government to classify information creates a cor-
relative obligation to obey its classification directives. According the
press the power to disclose information classified by the government
would deny such obligations, defying the state’s authority to classify.
As Sagar argues:
[we] cannot simply authorize (…) reporters and publishers to disclose classified information as
they see fit: to do so would create a contradiction in the structure of public authority, with one
bearer of public authority ((…) reporters and publishers) allowed to disclose what another
bearer of public authority (the executive) has been allowed to conceal.52
Thirdly, if the press were in some sense an agent of the public,
providing people with information they have ‘a right to know’, the
people should also be able to hold the press to account for its
performances. Yet the idea of the accountability of the press to the
public is problematic. Whereas the accountability of executive,
legislative, and judicial institutions to society is ensured, the media in
almost all democracies are in private hands, free to operate according
to their own will, subject only to general legal restrictions. There are
no formal, enforceable mechanisms of holding the press to account
for how well it performs as a trustee of the ‘people’s right to know’.
Imagine a journalist discovering information the public might
consider relevant. Is she therefore obligated to provide this informa-
tion to the public, and can the public hold her to account if she does
not? Ronald Dworkin drove this point home when reflecting on
claims that the public could legitimately raise against journalists.
Imagine, he says, that The New York Times chose not to publish the
Pentagon Papers. Would this entitle someone to sue the newspaper
for not publishing them?53 This suggestion, he concedes, would be
met with horror by most journalists.
52 Sagar, Secrets and Leaks, p. 117. Not much would be gained by adopting an alternative view of
authority, in which it only has moral permission to issue directives for action and attach sanctions to
disobedience. In that case, the press still has a duty to accept the risk of bearing sanctions.
53 Dworkin, R. 1980. ‘Does the Public Have a Right to Know?’ In: Appendix: The Request of the NIH for
a Limited Exemption from FOIA. Ethics Advisory Board, Department of Health and Human Services, p.
15.
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Similarly, if special newsgathering privileges were conferred upon
the press by the public, the public might require that the press meet
certain standards of training, knowledge, and objectivity in reporting.
Could the public choose to institutionally enforce these standards?54
Could special newsgathering privileges be withdrawn if the press
does not measure up to certain standards such that if, say, The New
York Times fails to meet these standards, then its newsgathering
privileges will be withdrawn?55
Finally, even if one could surmount these problems and make
sense of the idea that the people have entrusted the press with
protecting and enforcing their ‘right to know’, this argument would
not confer upon the press the right to disseminate unauthorized
disclosures. This is because the ‘people’s right to know’ does not
extend to information legitimately classified by government. In ef-
fect, the press as agent of the people cannot appeal to that right by
way of justifying its publication decisions: The agent cannot have a
right to provide the principal with information that the principal has
no right to receive. As I detailed this argument elsewhere, below I
indicate only its main lines.56
F. The press as a trustee of the ‘people’s right to know’
There are two arguments commonly invoked to support the ‘peo-
ple’s right to know’ government-held information. According to the
first, this ‘right to know’ is a human right. Thus, for example, Patrick
Birkinshaw claims that access to government-held information is
54 Schauer, ‘Rights and the Right to Know’, p. 73.
55 In response to this, one might suggest that the principle-agent relation between media and people
involves moral, not legal accountability; to do so, one could refer to the professional codes of journalist
ethics. The moral guidelines that the codes articulate are presented as requirements that befall the
media in their capacity as a trustee of the people implying that the people can hold the media morally
accountable for living up to those moral standards (e.g., the British National Union of Journalists’ Code
of Conduct states: ‘All members of the press have a duty to maintain the highest professional and ethical
standards. […] they should have regard to the provisions of this Code of Practice and to safeguarding
the public’s right to know’). This reading of the codes is unwarranted. Codes of journalist ethics are the
outcome of self-regulation by the media (Koene, D. 2009. Press Councils in Western Europe. Netherlands
Press Council Foundation/The Netherlands Press Fund, The Hague). Moreover, submission to them is
voluntary. This means that whatever moral responsibilities the media recognize, they are responsi-
bilities that are self-imposed rather than imposed by the people. That is, whatever moral accountability
mechanisms the professional codes imply, they do not indicate mechanisms affecting the profession
from without, by the public at large.
56 Mokrosinska, ‘The People’s Right to Know and State Secrecy’.
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‘fundamental to my membership as a full member of the human race’.57
A human right to know government-held information is also men-
tioned in various political documents.58 Scholarship underpinning
this position conceives of human rights in two different ways. The
first understands human rights on the natural rights model. Propo-
nents of this approach claim that all human rights, like natural rights,
are generated out of the urgent, universal interest in the exercise of
human agency and autonomy.59 It is not immediately clear how a
claim to access government information satisfies this description.
Presumably, an argument to this effect could begin with a general
moral claim emphasizing that access to information is necessary for
the capacity for autonomous and intentional action. As Matthew
Liao and Adam Etinson say: ‘The relevant basic human right may be
that of acquiring the knowledge necessary to be an adequately
functioning individual in one’s circumstances, or, perhaps even more
basic than that, the right to effective agency’.60 Secondly, one could
argue that information under government control belongs with the
information necessary to the capacity for autonomous, intentional
action. Whether this argument holds, however, depends on how one
specifies the general moral claim to the information necessary to
autonomous action in modern societies. Under the conditions of
pluralism and disagreement characterizing modern societies, general
moral claims can be specified in many different, competing ways.
Starting with disagreements about the value of autonomy and con-
ditions for autonomous action, people will disagree about what
information they need in order to act in autonomously. Some may
consider intelligence information necessary to making autonomous
political choices; others may not. Those who agree that intelligence
information is necessary will disagree about its scope. If information
about electronic surveillance is necessary to make autonomous
political choices, is all other intelligence information similarly nec-
57 Birkinshaw, P. 2006. ‘Transparency as a Human Right’. In Ch. Hood and D. Heald (eds.)
Transparency: The key to better governance? Oxford University Press, p. 56.
58 Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 10 of the ECHR protect freedom to receive information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. See also the 2004 Joint
Declaration by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression.
59 Griffin, J. 2008. On Human Rights. Oxford University Press.
60 Liao, S. and Etinson, A. 2012. ‘Political and naturalistic conceptions of human rights: A false
polemic?’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 9, p. 339.
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essary? If only some of it, which? What other information under
government control is similarly necessary: Diplomatic cables?
Internal memos and minutes of meetings with government advisors?
Tax records of office holders? Their medical records?
The few human rights theorists who have addressed the problem
of translating general moral claims into concrete, action-guiding rules
do so by reference to political decision-making. As Samantha Besson
says, it is ‘the law [that] turns universal moral rights into human
rights’.61 According to Seyla Benhabib, under conditions of disagree-
ment regarding the content of human rights, people should be given
an equal say, that is, universal claims should be specified in the process
of democratic decision-making.62 This answer to the specification
problem has important consequences for the scope of the human right
to access government-held information. Even if the right to know has
a normative status prior to political decision-making, it is the decision-
maker, viz. the state, that determines the exact contents of the right to
know by resolving the disagreement about the boundaries of the right
to know. Before I proceed let me qualify this argument. To the extent
that the state exercises (arbitrating) authority over people, it is in
virtue of the reasons that individuals have to be subject to it.63 Such
reasons, therefore, articulate the side constraints on the political
decision-making process; decisions that do not serve those reasons are
not binding. The state’s authority to determine the content of the
human right to know is similarly restricted. On one traditional view,
political authority is instituted for the preservation of the lives and
property of the citizens. Correspondingly, political decisions that
undermine these aims are illegitimate. From this perspective, denying
people access to information without which they would run serious
health risks is not legitimate. The state’s power to determine the
content and scope of the human right to know is, thus, not absolute.
Yet, as long as the state, in making the right to know effective in its
political decision-making, exercises its powers within the boundaries of
61 Besson, S. 2014. ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’. In R. Cruft, S. Liao and N. Renzo (Eds),
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Oxford University Press, p. 284.
62 Benhabib, S. 2011. ‘Is There a Human Right to Democracy? Beyond Interventionism and Indif-
ference’. In C. Corradetti (ed.) Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights: Some Contemporary Views,
Springer, p. 65.
63 Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom, Clarendon Press; Christiano, The Constitution of Equality;
Simmons, J. 2001. Justification and Legitimacy, Cambridge University Press; Mokrosinska, D. 2012.
Rethinking Political Obligation. Moral Principles, Communal Ties, Citizenship. Palgrave Macmillan.
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legitimate authority it also determines the limits of this right. A clas-
sification regime is one way of doing this. In effect, people have no
human right to access information that the government has classified
legitimately. Correspondingly, the press cannot appeal to this right to
justify its publication decisions on classified information: as the people
have no right to receive it, the press is not entitled to give it to them.
Similar conclusions follow when one understands the ‘people’s
right to know’ along the lines of a second dominant conception of
human rights, the ‘political conception’.64 On this view, human
rights introduce a system of standards for the domestic conduct of
governments that reasonable states would agree to adopt even
though disagreeing about their justification. From this perspective,
to claim that access to government information is a human right is to
claim that access to government information is a pre-institutional
moral right to which every reasonable state would give effect in its
legislation lest it lose its claim to legitimacy. Just as in the conception
of human rights modelled on natural rights, on this conception a
human right to access to government information acquires its
specific content and scope in national legislation. To the extent that
the human right to know is made effective in the particular leg-
islative setting, the state, in institutionalizing a human right to access
some government information, also sets limits to it (within the
boundaries of legitimate authority). From this perspective, the
‘people’s right to know’ does not extend to information access to
which the state limits. In effect, the press cannot appeal to that right
to justify its publication of that information.
Above I have considered the press’s claim that by publishing
classified government information it provides people with informa-
tion they have a ‘right to know’. This claim, I argued, does not hold
if we understand the ‘people’s right to know’ as a human right. The
‘people’s right to know’, however, can also be understood as a right
of democratic citizenship.65 Let me briefly consider whether this
makes the press’s appeal to this right more plausible.
64 Rawls, J. 1999. The law of peoples. Cambridge University Press; Beitz, C. 2003. ‘What Human
Rights Mean’. Daedalus 132; Cohen, J. 2006. ‘Is There a Human Right to Democracy?’ In Ch. Sypnowich
(ed.), The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen. Oxford University Press.
65 Birkinshaw, ‘Transparency as a Human Right’. Joint Declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.
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An appeal to citizenship as the ground of the people’s right to
access government information is as common as an appeal to human
rights. Birkinshaw mentions it in one breath with an appeal to human
rights: ‘The right to information (…) is fundamental to my position as
a citizen and a human being’.66 This, too, is included in various
political documents.67 Here, the people’s right to know arises from the
relations between citizens and the state, the principal-agent relation, as
explained above, where citizen-principals authorize state-official-agents
to rule on their behalf, the agents providing an account of their ac-
tions. Now, as Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes
point out, to the extent that state officials have the authority to rule,
they also have the authority to establish rules of information access:
The peculiarity of the principal-agent relation entailed in the relation of political representation is
that our agents are our rulers: we designate them as agents so that they would tell us what to do,
and we even give them the authority to coerce us to do it. And the rules that our agents impose
on us include access to information. (…). The principal-agent model entailed in the relation of
representation is a peculiar one, insofar as it is the agents who decide what principals will know
about their actions.68
This implies that if state agents have the authority to establish rules of
information access, they also have the authority to limit its scope. Thus,
the people have no right to know the information the state lawfully
withholds and, consequently, the press cannot appeal to that right to
justify its publication of classified information. In objecting to this
argument, one may argue that the people must have a right to full access
to all government information as a condition of their right to call state
officials to account. Note, however, that full disclosure of government
information to citizens at large is not necessary to ensure accountability;
there are mechanisms of accountability that do not require full
transparency (oversight committees, retrospective disclosures).69 As long
as such mechanisms are in place, the scope of the ‘people’s right to
know’ does not extend to information that the people, in their capacity
as principals, have authorized their agents viz. state officials to classify.
Above I have considered the claim that the press, in virtue of its
role as the ‘fourth branch of government’ and a trustee of the
66 Brirkinshaw, ‘Transparency as a Human Right’, p. 56.
67 For example, the 2004 Joint Declaration states that ‘[a]ccess to information is a citizens’ right’. In:
A Hulin (ed.). 2013. Joint Declarations of the representatives of intergovernmental bodies to protect free media
and expression, p. 34.
68 Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., Manin, B. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cam-
bridge University Press, p. 17.
69 Pozen, ‘Leaky Leviathan’; Mokrosinska, ‘Political Authority and State Secrecy’.
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‘people’s right to know’, enjoys a privileged position with regard to
disclosing classified government information. I reject this claim be-
cause we cannot make sense of the role of the press thus described.
This does not mean that the press plays no role in democratic
society, only that the fourth estate model does not properly describe
it. Below I consider another argument regarding the role of the press
and ask whether it entails a special privilege to disclose classified
government information.
G. The press as expert communicator
There is a broad consensus that the role of the press includes,
minimally, reporting events of public importance: Providing ‘news’
to the public. This informational role of the press includes both
transmitting specialist knowledge from government and giving voice
to public opinion by enabling the principal organizations and groups
in society to be heard.70 In that, the press sets in motion processes of
political communication between government, interest groups and
citizens. It has been widely recognized that in contemporary plu-
ralistic, mass societies, activating this public communicative sphere
cannot be done by means other than the press or, more generally,
the media. For example, James Bohman observes that ‘[r]ather than
(…) addressing each other in face-to-face interaction, most [political]
communication passes through various expert communicators who
package exchanges and discussions for audiences’.71 Given the ‘sheer
size of the body of citizens and the complexity of social problems’,
the press is uniquely positioned to do this mediating job: ‘because of
their breadth, the media necessary for these tasks are thus ‘mass
media’. Informal mechanisms alone would be empirically and nor-
matively insufficient for this task’.72
70 Curran, J. 2005. ‘What democracy requires of the media’. In: G. Overholser and K. Jamieson
(Eds.) The Press. Oxford University Press, p. 130.
71 Bohman, J. 2000. ‘The Division of labor in democratic discourse: media, experts and deliberative
democracy’. In S. Chambers and A. Costain, (Eds,) Deliberation, Democracy and the Media. Rowman and
Littlefield, p. 49
72 ibid, pp. 55, 56. Among others Bollinger, Images of a Free Press; Gurevitch and Blumer (Gurevitch,
M. and Blumler, J. 1990. ‘Political communication systems and democratic values’. In J. Lichtenberg
(ed.) Democracy and the mass media. Cambridge University Press); Habermas (Habermas, J. 2006. ‘Po-
litical Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension?’ Com-
munication Theory 16(4)) endorse this view (while acknowledging that the press currently performs
poorly).
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This view of the press avoids the pitfalls of the fourth estate
argument. Unlike that model, whatever privileges and responsibili-
ties attach to the role the press performs in the public domain, they
do not arise from a principal-agent relation. Rather, they reflect the
necessity of mediated communication in modern democracies, and
the unique position the press occupies in the public space to perform
this job. In other words, it is only insofar as the press plays a unique
role in the public communicative space, which is, as Habermas
would say,73 a shared good in a democracy, that it holds special
privileges and responsibilities. Does the unique role of the press
described thus confer upon it a privilege to disseminate classified
information?
The argument presupposes that democracy is the ultimate
foundation of the informational role of the press. This implies that
the press, in performing its role, must respect democratic principles
including the principle of the democratic allocation of power: If
democratic government has authority to classify, then the role of the
press cannot extend to disclosing classified information because, as I
argued with Sagar above, this would introduce a contradiction into
the structure of democratic authority with one political actor (re-
porters/publishers) allowed to disclose what another political actor
(government) has been allowed to conceal. The role of expert
communicator does not endow the press with a privilege to disclose
information the government is authorized to classify.
So far, I have reviewed one class of arguments defending the
different treatment that leakers and press receive for violating the
law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures. According to them, leaking
and publishing leaks are equally wrong, but the wrong committed by
the press is justified in a way that the wrong committed by leakers is
not. None of the arguments considered - an appeal to press freedom;
the chilling effect of regulation; press property rights; the special role
of the press as the ‘fourth estate’ and trustee of the ‘people’s right to
know’; the press’s role as expert communicator - succeeds in
establishing a privileged position for the press with regard to dis-
closing classified information. If the practice of selective prosecution
is justified, it would have to be in terms other than those considered
73 Habermas, ‘Political Communication’.
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so far. Below I examine a different strategy to make sense of the
difference in treatment that leakers and press receive.
II. THE SECOND ARGUMENT FROM DISANALOGY: LEAKING IS WORSE
THAN PUBLISHING LEAKS
Perhaps this difference in treatment reflects a moral difference be-
tween leaking and publishing leaks viz. that leaking constitutes a
more serious wrong than publishing leaks and, therefore, deserves
harsher punishment. Lawyers and legal scholars have suggested two
variants of this argument. According to one, leaking should be
considered worse than publishing leaks in the same sense in which,
for example, stealing is considered worse than distributing stolen
goods (fencing). According to the second version of the argument,
leaking is worse than publishing leaks because leaking, unlike pub-
lishing leaks, involves an additional wrong on top of violating the
law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures.
A. Stealing information is worse than distributing stolen information
Legal scholars who entertain the idea that leaking is the worse of-
fense hint at the difference between stealing information and dis-
tributing stolen information. Stealing and distributing objects which
one knows (or believes) to be stolen are different acts with a different
moral import. Whereas both are wrong, they differ in degree of
wrongness, stealing being more serious than fencing. The suggestion
is that leaking constitutes the more serious wrong because leaking
involves theft and publishing leaks does not. The point was clearly
articulated by a US federal judge who ruled in 1990 in favor of a
newspaper that published a leaked document from a local police
department:
There is ‘‘a distinction in the criminal law between thieves and receivers of stolen goods (…).
This court does not mean to say that the media are liable to the same degree as those who act
improperly for it, or those who supply it with improperly obtained material. But the distinctions
are of degree, not of kind.’’74
This way of explaining the difference in treatment between leakers
and press is problematic on two counts. First, the legal foundation of
the claim that fencing is a lesser offense than theft is not obvious.
74 Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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The status of fencing in Anglo-American law has fluctuated. Early
Anglo-American law did not register fencing as a crime at all. In the
19th century, fencing was considered an offense subject to lesser
penalties than theft. In the 20th century fencing has come to be
treated as interchangeable with theft and subject to the same
punishment. Thus, the US Model Penal Code treats fencing as an
alternative means of committing theft and subjects it to the same
penalty.75 The 1968 English Penal Code even includes the possibility
of a harsher penalty for fencing.76 Given its mutable status on the
statute books, and especially its status in current law, fencing is not
necessarily a lighter offense deserving lighter treatment than stealing
goods. By the same token, publishing leaks is not necessarily a lighter
offense deserving lighter treatment than leaking.
Second, while the difference between theft and fencing rests on
uncertain legal foundations, it can perhaps be made on moral
grounds. Even so, it is not clear we can extend it to the distinction
between theft and distribution of stolen government information. To
explain why, let me first reconstruct the moral content of the wrong
involved between theft and fencing.
The thief’s wrong consists in the harm he inflicts on the owner by
depriving her of her property rights. With regard to the fence’s
wrong, we can adopt two interpretations. First, the fence’s wrong
consists in perpetuating the wrongful deprivation of the victim
owner’s property rights first effected by the thief. Second, the fence’s
wrong consists in encouraging the commission of future thefts by
helping to create a market for stolen goods: ‘without receivers [and
distributors]’, as Stuart Green puts it, ‘there would be no thieves’.77
Placed in this conceptual frame, the leakers-thieves would deprive
government of its property rights in certain classes of information.
The press, as distributors of stolen information, would either per-
petuate the prior harm conferred by the leakers-thieves and/or
encourage more information theft by creating a market for leaks.
The latter reading is problematic: The argument that the distributor
encourages further thefts commits us to claiming that there would
be no leaks without the press. However, we can imagine cases of
75 Green, S. 2011. ‘Thieving and Receiving: Overcriminalizing the Possession of Stolen Property’.
New Criminal Law Review 14(1), pp. 39–40.
76 ibid, pp. 36–38.
77 ibid, p. 46.
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stealing government information without the intention of publishing
it. I suggest ignoring this perspective and paying closer attention to
the former.
On this reading, as Green puts it, the thief harms the property
owner by causing a radical, involuntary change in her relationship to
her property: From possession to non-possession. ‘Unlike the thief,
the receiver [and distributor] does not cause any change in the status
of the owner’s rights’, Green argues. He merely perpetuates the
harm inflicted by the thief. Given that ‘perpetuating an owner’s loss
of property is a lesser wrong than causing him to lose his property to
begin with’,78 Green says, the receiver/distributor of stolen property
deserves less blame than the thief. Applied to the divide between the
leakers and the press, the leakers-thieves harm the government by
causing the radical, involuntary change in the government’s rela-
tionship to its property in information: From possession to non-
possession. The press, as distributor of stolen information, merely
perpetuates the prior harm effectuated by the leakers-thieves and,
thereby, deserves less blame and punishment. But this description is
inaccurate in the context of goods such as information. Whereas
stealing, say, a bicycle, involves a transfer of property, in the case of
stealing information it would be incorrect to say that any transfer of
property has taken place. This is because even if the leaker steals
government information, government is not deprived of information
in the sense in which a bike owner is deprived of her bike. The
government still has the information; what it has lost is exclusive
access to it: now, not only the government but also the leaker has
access to information. If there is a change in the government’s
relationship to certain classes of information effectuated by the lea-
ker-thief, then it is a change from exclusivity of possession to non-
exclusivity of possession.
This way of spelling out the wrong involved in unauthorized
disclosures challenges the claim that leaking is worse than publishing
leaks and, thus, that leakers should be prosecuted more harshly than
the press. The challenge comes in either of two ways. In the first
scenario, it reverses the moral book-keeping and presents the press’s
distributing information as worse than the leaker’s stealing it. In the
78 ibid, pp. 45, 37.
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second scenario, it shows that press and leaker are implicated to the
same degree.
Let me start with the first scenario: The wrong involved in
leaking/stealing government information consists of depriving gov-
ernment of exclusive access to certain classes of information. Note
that exclusivity of access to information has degrees. Whereas a bike
cannot be more or less stolen, information access can be more or less
exclusive: We speak of a higher degree of exclusivity when fewer
individuals have access to information, and of a lower degree of
exclusivity when more individuals do. Given that exclusivity of ac-
cess is a matter of degree, its loss is a matter of degree too. Now the
degree to which government is deprived of exclusivity of access is
lower when only the leaker can access it and higher when it can be
accessed by millions of citizens. Correspondingly, any harm the
government suffers is more serious when its information can be
accessed by millions of citizens. If this is the case, then it is incorrect
to claim that leaking-stealing government information is worse than
publishing-distributing stolen government information. Given that it
is the press that discloses the stolen information to millions of its
readers, the press does not merely perpetuate the prior harm in-
flicted by the leakers-thieves; it aggravates it by increasing the degree
of the deprivation of exclusivity of access. This is recognized by most
commentators when they say that ‘[l]eaks of classified government
information pose little threat without the press as a medium for
public disclosure’.79 This line of argument takes us to the following
conclusion: Even if distributing stolen bikes is less bad than stealing
them, it is incorrect to argue that publishing stolen government
information is less bad than stealing government information. If the
comparison holds at all, the press should be penalized to a higher
degree because the wrong it commits is more serious than the wrong
involved in leaking.
The line of argument presented above assumes that the leaker’s
stealing classified government information and the press’s publishing
it are two unrelated events. Whether this is indeed the case depends,
however, on the intentions that the leaker has in disclosing classified
information to the press. If the leaker steals government information
with the intention that the press discloses it to the public at large
79 Xanders, ‘A Handyman’s Guide’, p. 767.
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(rather than the press merely further investigating the matter),
leaking and publishing are inherently related. As the leaker is not
separate from the publication of the classified information by the
press but rather implicated in it, the leaker is also involved in the
supposed wrong committed by the press, namely the publication of
classified information. In other words, the leaker foresees and in-
tends the result of millions having access to the classified informa-
tion. In this scenario, the wrong committed by press and leaker is the
same. As there is no difference in the wrong thus committed, there is
no reason to differentiate prosecution. Importantly, independent of
whichever scenario we take, the actual practice of selective prose-
cution focusing on leakers and leaving the press unpunished is
unjustified.
B. Two wrongs versus one
Another way of explaining why leaking is worse than publishing
leaks is to say that while both leaking and publishing leaks violate the
law, leaking involves an additional wrong on top of it. Namely, the
leakers not only violate the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures,
they also violate their contractual obligations. Snowden consented to
nondisclosure as a condition of his employment at the NSA. When
he leaked classified information, he not only violated the law but also
his contractual obligations. Sometimes, instead of pointing to their
contractual obligations, one points to the obligations that civil ser-
vants and government employees acquire in virtue of the profes-
sional role they occupy. On this view, civil servants are role-
obligated to comply with their superiors’ directives, including
directives to respect the classified character of certain documents;
when they leak these, they not only violate the law but also their
professional obligations.80
The fact that leakers violate contractual or professional obliga-
tions in addition to violating the law seems to implicate leakers more
than the press. When publishing classified information, Greenwald,
unlike Snowden, was not bound by a government contract nor was
he a government employee. Thus, he was not subject to corre-
sponding obligations. Not bound by such obligations, he did not
80 Boot, ‘Classified Public Whistleblowing’, p. 549.
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violate them. In effect, whereas Snowden committed two wrongs,
Greenwald committed only one. Given the difference in the degree
of wrongdoing, the difference in prosecution seems logical as a
matter of proportionality: More severe wrongs should be punished
more and less severe wrongs less.
Reasoning along these lines, Heidi Kitrosser argues that the
protection offered to civil servants leaking classified information
should be weaker than the protection offered to the press for pub-
lishing it.81 In Kitrosser’s view, unauthorized disclosures by both civil
servants and the press should be seen as political speech protected by
freedom of speech legislation.82 This is because unauthorized dis-
closures, unless they risk grave damage to national security, consti-
tute a check on government supplementing the structural oversight
mechanisms. This means that while both civil servants and the press
violate the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures, this wrong can
be mitigated by presenting it as an exercise of political speech.
However, while both civil servants and the press can appeal to their
right to political speech when they disclose classified government
information, the exercise of this right by civil servants conflicts with
their duties in their capacities as part of the executive branch to
contribute to its efficacy (including its secret-keeping efforts), a duty
the violation of which the press is not guilty of. The wrong civil
servants commit when disclosing classified information is therefore
greater than the wrong committed by the press and their claim to
freedom of speech protection is weaker.
Note that the ‘two-wrongs-versus-one’ argument, if correct, ap-
plies only to cases in which the additional wrong the leaker commits,
viz. violation of her contractual and/or professional obligations,
cannot be justified. If civil servants are justified in violating their
contractual and/or professional obligations, there is no sense in
which this violation implicates them more than the press. Under
these circumstances, the only moral wrongs that would enter the
moral book-keeping refer to the violation of the law prohibiting
unauthorized disclosures, and the argument registers no difference
between leakers and press in this respect. Moreover, if the violation
of the contractual obligation by leakers is justified (because, for
81 Kitrosser, ‘Leak Prosecutions’, p. 926.
82 ibid, p. 908.
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example, the information the civil servant leaks reveals an abuse of
power by the government), so too is her violation of the obligation
to obey the law, in which case no moral wrong can be registered at
all. If disclosures of classified information by civil servants satisfy
these criteria, the same disclosures subsequently published by the
press must satisfy them too. Therefore, the violation of the law on
the part of the press must be justified too. Again, we have no reason
to treat these two classes of agents differently. If anything, we have
reason to refrain from prosecution in both cases.
The ‘two-wrongs-versus-one’ argument holds, then, only on the
assumption that disclosures lack justification of the kind indicated
above. If this is the case, does the disclosure of classified information
implicate the leakers more than the press and does this difference
justify the difference in prosecution? To answer these questions, we
must measure and compare the wrongs committed by leakers and
press.
C. Calculating wrongs
I argued earlier that the wrong involved in unauthorized disclosures
consists in the government’s loss of exclusive access to certain classes
of information. Accordingly, its severity is measured by the number
of people who acquire access to information formerly in the exclu-
sive possession of government: The wrong is greater when more
people acquire access to it; it is lesser when fewer people acquire
access. Having specified the wrong of disclosure as depriving gov-
ernment from exclusive access to certain classes of information, I
argued that the wrong involved in leaking is not greater than the
wrong involved in publishing leaks. Rather, even if leakers commit
two wrongs compared to one wrong committed by the press, the
total wrong they commit is either less than the wrong committed by
the press (the leaker reveals classified information only to the re-
porter; the press multiplies the unauthorized access by millions of
readers) or equal to it (both leaker and press reveal classified gov-
ernment information to millions of readers). I concluded that the
‘two-wrongs-versus-one’ argument fails to explain why we should
prosecute leakers more than the press.
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The argument above specifies the wrong involved in the leaker’s
breach of contract in terms of its consequences viz. the number of
people acquiring unauthorized access to classified information. Per-
haps, however, this consequentialist reading is insufficient as a
description of the wrong involved in unauthorized disclosures by
leakers. Instead, we should see it in non-consequentialist terms as a
violation of the civil servants’ duty to act as specified by their con-
tract and/or professional role. This non-consequentialist reading of
the wrong committed by leakers identifies a difference in their
normative situation compared to the press: As the press is not a party
to the wrongdoing understood like this, there is no sense in which it
can aggravate the wrong committed by civil servants; as it does not
stand in the employment relationship to the government, it does not
commit a similar wrong. This non-consequentialist reading of the
‘two-wrongs-versus-one’ argument identifies a disanalogy in the
normative situation of leakers and press. Does this disanalogy justify
the difference in prosecution?
It does, but not in the form it takes in current practice. The ‘two-
wrongs-versus-one’ argument sets out to explain the difference in
prosecution by pointing to the difference in wrongdoing. In postu-
lating that the difference in prosecution should reflect the difference
in wrongdoing, it relies on the proportionality principle, which re-
quires that more severe wrongs should be punished more. Recall
that currently leakers are prosecuted, and the press goes unpunished.
On the logic of the proportionality principle, the absence of prose-
cution should reflect the absence of a wrong to be prosecuted.
Hence, in order to justify refraining from prosecuting the press, the
argument would have to claim either that the press commits no
wrong or that the wrong it commits viz. violation of the law should
be discounted. By claiming that the press commits no wrong, the
‘two-wrongs-versus-one’ argument would contradict itself: It explic-
itly concedes that the press is guilty (even if only of one wrong). The
latter option viz. discounting the violation of the law as an offense
deserving prosecution is problematic because any reasons for dis-
counting the violation of the law by the press as an offense deserving
prosecution (e.g., democracy-enhancing consequences of disclosures
or disclosing information revealing government wrongdoing) apply
to the leakers too. Now if such reasons justify the violation of the
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law by the leakers, then they must also justify the additional wrong
they commit in disclosing classified information viz. violation of
contract/role obligations. In effect, there is no moral wrong that
either the press or the leakers commit. Ergo, the argument cannot
provide grounds for differentiating prosecution because it would
commit us to dropping prosecution altogether.
In conclusion, even if the leaker’s breach of contractual and/or
professional obligations establishes a difference in the moral situation
of leakers and press, this difference is insufficient to justify the cur-
rent practice of prosecuting leakers and not the press.
D. Unauthorized disclosures and professional duties of the press
The ‘two-wrongs-versus-one’ argument stipulates that the normative
situation of leakers and press is disanalogous. Whereas both are
guilty of unauthorized disclosures, leakers, unlike the press, commit
an additional wrong: violating their professional duties. This section
inquires into whether a similar argument can be made with regard to
the press.
Journalists, like doctors, lawyers, engineers or accountants, con-
sider themselves professionals in their own field, claiming to adhere
to a set of ethical standards governing their role.83 As argued above,
the professional obligations of the press cannot be understood on the
fourth estate model; however, they can be understood in terms of
the informational role of the press, a role the press acquires in virtue
of its unique position in the public space of mediated communica-
tion. Following Sagar, I argued that, on pain of creating a contra-
diction in the structure of democratic authority, the informational
role of the press does not extend to disseminating information the
democratically elected government has classified legitimately. Here,
I draw a further implication from that argument: When the press
publishes information legitimately classified by government, it vio-
lates its professional role. This puts the press on the same footing as
leakers. Thus, there is no reason for treating the press differently
when it comes to accountability for unauthorized disclosures: pros-
ecutors should either prosecute both (even if the violation of pro-
83 Sigma Delta Chi (US); the UK Code of Professional Ethics of the Institute of Journalists, etc.
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fessional duties by civil servants and by journalists calls for different
sanctions) or neither.
III. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have reflected on the moral puzzle that the difference
in treatment that leakers and press receive with regard to unau-
thorized disclosures of classified information poses. Whereas both
leaking and publishing classified information violate the law pro-
hibiting unauthorized disclosures, the prosecution focuses on the
leakers, leaving the press unpunished. Assuming that state secrecy is,
under certain conditions, legitimate, I have argued that as far as
normative assessments are concerned, there is no moral reason for
making a difference between the civil servants who leak classified
information and the press who publishes it: If the prosecution targets
leakers, it should also target the press. If the press goes unpunished,
so should leakers.
If selective prosecution is not a matter of moral principle, its
resilience can be explained in terms of the pragmatic interests
guiding prosecutorial discretion. Social scientists have suggested that
if the press is not prosecuted it isn’t because it does no wrong or is
less culpable than leakers, but because this might be government
information management.84 Or that the executive has a strong
incentive to avoid criminalizing reporters and publishers rather than
compromise the government’s instrumental use of the press,85 the
press retaliating by publicizing the foibles of officials.86 Full discus-
sion of the pragmatic considerations guiding prosecutorial discretion
goes beyond the scope of this paper. The point here was to search
for a moral principle justifying the practice; one has not been found.
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